Joint Ross T&O and SBEE Seminar: Ignacio Rios, University of Notre Dame
Abstract
Motivated by the persistent decline in individual giving, we study the impact of two key design choices for fundraising campaigns on donation behavior and overall outcomes: (i) the incentive mechanisms, including matching, gift unlock, and a no-financial-incentive baseline, and (ii) the solicitation mechanism, where donors are approached simultaneously or sequentially. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to examine the behavioral effects of these two design choices. First, we find that matching increases overall donations relative to the baseline, but reduces individual contributions at high match rates due to crowding out. Second, gift unlock substantially increases individual and overall donations under simultaneous solicitation but performs poorly under sequential settings due to coordination failures. Third, we show that the effectiveness of each mechanism is shaped not only by the solicitation structure but also by the uncertainty in donors’ participation. Our findings offer practical guidance for fundraisers: Gift unlock with simultaneous solicitation works best when donor participation is expected to be high. In contrast, matching is more effective when participation is uncertain, especially under sequential solicitation, where contributions are visible. Overall, our results show that aligning design choices with donors’ behavior is essential for maximizing the effectiveness of fundraising campaigns.
Link to Paper
About the SBEE Seminar Series
The Social, Behavioral and Experimental Economics seminar series brings together a community of economics scholars from three units at the University of Michigan — the School of Information, the Department of Economics and the Ross Business School — whose research aims to broaden the understanding of the social, economic and political consequences of real-life decisions and behaviors.
Top researchers from around the globe come to Michigan to present their work at the SBEE seminar series, exploring the intersection of economics, psychology, computer science and information science.
The seminar series is organized by U-M faculty members Yan Chen (UMSI), Alain Cohn (UMSI), Erin Krupka (UMSI), Stephen Leider (Ross), Christine Exley (Econ), A. Yesim Orhun (Ross), Tanya Rosenblat (UMSI), Karthik Srinivasan (UMSI) and Basit Zafar (Econ). Todd Stuart and Robin Kocher serve as seminar coordinators.
Joint Seminar with Ross Technology & Operations.
Featured Speaker
Ignacio Rios
University of Notre Dame
Ignacio Rios is an Associate Professor of Information Technology, Analytics and Operations at the Mendoza College of Business at University of Notre Dame. He holds a Ph.D. in Operations, Information, and Technology and an M.A. in Economics from Stanford University, as well as degrees in Operations Management and Industrial Engineering from the University of Chile. Prior to joining University of Notre Dame, he was an Assistant Professor of Operations Management at the Jindal School of Management, University of Texas at Dallas. His research expertise lies in behavioral market design, with a focus on how incentives, information, allocation rules and users' behavior shape outcomes in markets without money. Ignacio has played a leading role in the reform of Chile’s school choice and college admissions systems, and also in designing other two-sided matching markets. His work has been recognized with numerous awards, including the Poets & Quants “40 Under 40 Best Business School Professors” distinction, the IFORS Prize for OR in Development, and the BOM Best Paper Award.
Contact: [email protected]